Science and philosophy (ERNEST H. HUTTEN )
To-day more than ever it has become clear to everyone what an
important role science plays
in the modern world. And of all the
sciences it is physics
that has shown itself to be most successful.
Physics is the most advanced of the natural sciences. The methods
and techniques of physics
are more accurate and more reliable
than those of any other science, and its results have been strongly
confirmed by experience. For this reason physics
is best fitted to
serve as an example of the ideas of modern science.
The material revolution science has brought about is felt everywhere; but the intellectual revolution, the change in ideas and concepts, has not penetrated far into every-day life. The intellectual climate in which we live lags behind the material or technical climate created by the discoveries of science and the inventions of industry. We may have heard the latest facts, but do we understand them? Can we achieve the intellectual integration which an understanding of science requires? Some years ago Einstein complained that 4 . . . many scientists were unable to grasp the meaning of the (relativity) theory itself; all they could understand were its consequences within their special field*. If this criticism holds true even for the average scientist, how much more does it apply to the man in the street?
It may be no exaggeration to say that the intellectual methods, the thinking habits which science requires, are largely unknown even to the educated layman. So far as physics is concerned we may doubt whether the average man has caught up with Galileo and Newton; and there are many who have not yet grasped what Aristotle knew two thousand years ago. People learn by rote certain results of science as applied to every-day life; they know how to manipulate gadgets ; they acquire skills. It would be wrong to underestimate the value of this practical knowledge; but it is too limited. Isn't it strange that a man should know how to run a machine, and yet not know what 'makes it tick' ? We need to make at least a little clearer what the concepts of modern physics are and how they differ from the corresponding ideas we all implicitly use in ordinary life.
And this is a task necessary for the development of physics itself. For it appears that physics has arrived at a temporary impasse. No new theories have been invented for some time in fact it was in 1927 that the theory of quantum mechanics made its appearance. For a hundred years at least there has been a brilliant succession of theories in physics. But during the last twenty-five years details have been filled in here and there, and minor developments have occurred: no new, and fundamental, theory has been proposed. Even the atomic bomb, as was often pointed out, is merely an application of principles that have been known for many years. New experiments have been made and a wealth of new data has been accumulated; but present theories cannot cope with them since only partial explanations and insufficient computations can be obtained. Thus it seems obvious to suggest that we must investigate the logical structure of our theories, or analyse the language of physics. We require a better understanding of science, for its own sake as well as for the sake of our civilisation of which science is an inalienable part.
At all times there were people who were aware of this need. Scientists and philosophers alike have tried therefore not only to present the results of science but to explain the intellectual methods. The Enlightenment of the eighteenth century, to some extent, was the attempt to explain and to understand Newtonian physics. And the Victorians, spurred on by the discoveries of biology and geology, tried to translate these new ideas into the language of every-day life. Often misunderstandings arose. But, in principle, one cannot fail to agree that a Philosophy of Science is needed to understand the intellectual discoveries of science.
ERNEST H. HUTTEN 1955
Reference: https://philosophy-of-sciences.blogspot.com/2018/12/the-language-of-modern-physics.html
The material revolution science has brought about is felt everywhere; but the intellectual revolution, the change in ideas and concepts, has not penetrated far into every-day life. The intellectual climate in which we live lags behind the material or technical climate created by the discoveries of science and the inventions of industry. We may have heard the latest facts, but do we understand them? Can we achieve the intellectual integration which an understanding of science requires? Some years ago Einstein complained that 4 . . . many scientists were unable to grasp the meaning of the (relativity) theory itself; all they could understand were its consequences within their special field*. If this criticism holds true even for the average scientist, how much more does it apply to the man in the street?
It may be no exaggeration to say that the intellectual methods, the thinking habits which science requires, are largely unknown even to the educated layman. So far as physics is concerned we may doubt whether the average man has caught up with Galileo and Newton; and there are many who have not yet grasped what Aristotle knew two thousand years ago. People learn by rote certain results of science as applied to every-day life; they know how to manipulate gadgets ; they acquire skills. It would be wrong to underestimate the value of this practical knowledge; but it is too limited. Isn't it strange that a man should know how to run a machine, and yet not know what 'makes it tick' ? We need to make at least a little clearer what the concepts of modern physics are and how they differ from the corresponding ideas we all implicitly use in ordinary life.
And this is a task necessary for the development of physics itself. For it appears that physics has arrived at a temporary impasse. No new theories have been invented for some time in fact it was in 1927 that the theory of quantum mechanics made its appearance. For a hundred years at least there has been a brilliant succession of theories in physics. But during the last twenty-five years details have been filled in here and there, and minor developments have occurred: no new, and fundamental, theory has been proposed. Even the atomic bomb, as was often pointed out, is merely an application of principles that have been known for many years. New experiments have been made and a wealth of new data has been accumulated; but present theories cannot cope with them since only partial explanations and insufficient computations can be obtained. Thus it seems obvious to suggest that we must investigate the logical structure of our theories, or analyse the language of physics. We require a better understanding of science, for its own sake as well as for the sake of our civilisation of which science is an inalienable part.
At all times there were people who were aware of this need. Scientists and philosophers alike have tried therefore not only to present the results of science but to explain the intellectual methods. The Enlightenment of the eighteenth century, to some extent, was the attempt to explain and to understand Newtonian physics. And the Victorians, spurred on by the discoveries of biology and geology, tried to translate these new ideas into the language of every-day life. Often misunderstandings arose. But, in principle, one cannot fail to agree that a Philosophy of Science is needed to understand the intellectual discoveries of science.
ERNEST H. HUTTEN 1955
Reference: https://philosophy-of-sciences.blogspot.com/2018/12/the-language-of-modern-physics.html
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