Between the science and philosophy of science

The distinction which has been indicated between science and philosophy of science is not a sharp one. It is based on a difference of intent rather than a difference in subject-matter. Consider the question of the relative adequacy of Young’s wave theory of light and Maxwell’s electromagnetic theory. It is the scientist qua scientist who judges Maxwell’s theory to be superior. And it is the philosopher of science (or the scientist qua philosopher of science) who investigates the general criteria of acceptability that are implied in judgements of this type. Clearly these activities interpenetrate. The scientist who is ignorant of precedents in the evaluation of theories is not likely to do an adequate job of evaluation himself. And the philosopher of science who is ignorant of scientific practice is not likely to make perceptive pronouncements on scientific method.

Recognition that the boundary-line between science and philosophy of science is not sharp is reflected in the choice of subject-matter for this historical survey. The primary source is what scientists and philosophers have said about scientific method. In some cases this is sufficient. It is possible to discuss the philosophies of science of Whewell and Mill, for example, exclusively in terms of what they have written about scientific method. In other cases, however, this is not sufficient. To present the philosophies of science of Galileo and Newton, it is necessary to strike a balance between what they have written about scientific method and their actual scientific practice.



Reference: From the introduction of the book in the following link:

https://philosophy-of-sciences.blogspot.com/2018/12/a-historical-introduction-to-philosophy.html